University of New Mexico

UNM Digital Repository
NotiSur

Latin America Digital Beat (LADB)

7-13-2001

Montesinos' Returns
Guest Author

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/notisur
Recommended Citation
Guest Author. "Montesinos' Returns." (2001). https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/notisur/12929

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Latin America Digital Beat (LADB) at UNM Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in NotiSur by an authorized administrator of UNM Digital Repository. For more information, please contact amywinter@unm.edu.

LADB Article Id: 53402
ISSN: 1089-1560

Montesinos' Returns
by Guest
Category/Department: Peru
Published: 2001-07-13
[The following article by Barbara J. Fraser is reprinted with the permission of Noticias Aliadas in
Lima, Peru. It first appeared in the July 9, 2001, edition of the weekly publication Latinamerica
Press.]
Former Peruvian national security adviser Vladimiro Montesinos was returned to Peru on June 25,
a day after he was captured in Venezuela. Just days earlier, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez
had flown to Peru where he met with president-elect Alejandro Toledo and promised that his
country would do everything possible to apprehend Montesinos. The former spy chief, who fled
Peru last year amid a corruption scandal that toppled the government of President Alberto Fujimori
(1990-2000), was long believed to be in Venezuela. Critics in Peru charged that top officials in
the Chavez government, including high military commanders, were protecting Montesinos (see
NotiSur, 2001-02-02).
Now that Montesinos is back in Peru after eight months as a fugitive, the country faces a dual
challenge: trying him in a legal system that, until recently, he controlled, and rewriting the rules
after a decade in which corruption became deeply rooted in public administration.
In a survey done in February and March as part of an anti-corruption program funded by the World
Bank, citizens and government functionaries identified corruption as one of the country's top
problems, second only to unemployment, while businesspeople ranked it as the greatest obstacle
to development. The magnitude of the problem has become more evident since the Fujimori
government fell last November following the airing of a video showing Montesinos bribing a newly
elected congressman to switch parties (see NotiSur, 2000-09-22, 2000- 10-06, 2000-12-08). Fujimori
fled to Japan and Montesinos was in hiding until his capture in Venezuela June 24.
Montesinos still trying to buy a deal Montesinos is charged in 67 cases ranging from bribery and
corruption of public officials to money laundering, illicit enrichment, and directing a death squad.
Another 94 cases are under investigation.
In a decade as the power behind Fujimori's presidency, Montesinos assembled a vast corruption
network, buying off or extorting judges, military officers, business owners, politicians, and media
magnates. Trying him, however, will not be easy. In his first court appearance, just hours after his
return to Lima, he reportedly said that he had 30,000 additional incriminating videos, including
some of judges and magistrates.
With the veiled threat, "he is already setting up an internal front within the judicial system in
an attempt to destabilize it," criminal law expert Luis Lamas said. "Montesinos will use this very
intelligently, because he has information and undoubtedly knows there are many magistrates who
have been involved in corruption and have not been sanctioned. He will wage a psychosocial war
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to gain a more advantageous position." In his first court statements, Montesinos also seemed to be
shifting blame to Fujimori, saying he was only an adviser acting under the president's orders.
A "collaboration law" allows suspects in the corruption investigation to testify in exchange for the
reduction or elimination of penalties. The deal does not apply to ringleaders, however. Lamas said
Montesinos may be trying to establish that he was not a leader to reduce the charges against him
and his family members. Under a severe law engineered by Montesinos and Fujimori in 1995, some
of the charges against Montesinos such as homicide, genocide or torture, drug trafficking, and
money laundering could carry a life sentence. Lesser charges carry a maximum sentence of 12 to 15
years, with early release a possibility.

Montesinos' arrest increased calls for Fujimori's extradition
The former adviser's return to Peru fueled calls for Japan to send Fujimori home. On June 27, Peru's
ambassador to Japan was recalled for consultation, but no extradition request has yet been made. In
a mid-June survey by the Apoyo polling company, 80% of respondents said they believed Fujimori
was guilty of corruption. Forty-two percent said they believed he approved operations by the death
squad known as Grupo Colina, while 34% said they believed he knew of the operations but could
not prevent them (see NotiSur, 2001-05-25). The two men now have few friends on their home turf.
Dozens of military officers, politicians, and businesspeople have been jailed as part of the corruption
investigations, and many are testifying in exchange for leniency.
When Montesinos returned, authorities immediately faced the problem of finding a prison where
he would be safe from other inmates who might seek revenge. Some have called for him to be held
in isolation, so he cannot continue to manage the remnants of his corruption network from behind
bars, but Lamas pointed out that isolation would be difficult, as he will be a key witness in dozens
of related cases involving other defendants. In an ironic twist, on June 28 he was transferred to the
Callao naval base where he had special cells constructed for terrorist leaders.

Differing versions of arrest strain relations with Venezuela
Conflicting accounts of Montesinos' capture led to friction between President Chavez and the
Peruvian government. After months during which Venezuelan authorities claimed that Montesinos
was not in their country, Chavez announced the spy chief's capture at the end of a summit of
Andean presidents, insisting that Venezuelan police had acted alone in the arrest. But US and
Peruvian officials immediately attributed the break in the case to the arrest in Miami, Florida, of a
former Venezuelan security agent who attempted to withdraw money from a US$38 million account
in Montesinos' name at the Pacific Industrial Bank.
Weeks earlier, Peruvian officials had asked the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to keep an
eye on the account. And on June 27, Peruvian Interior Minister Antonio Ketin Vidal said that
Venezuelan agents had intercepted Montesinos as he was about to turn himself in under a secret
deal with Peruvian authorities. Opposition legislators in Venezuela have opened an investigation
into accusations that Montesinos was protected by top officials in the Chavez government. The
multilateral wrangling, during which Venezuela and Peru recalled their ambassadors, reflects both
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the international nature of the corruption machine and the elaborate disinformation with which
Montesinos covered his tracks.

Corruption difficult to eradicate
With its drug-trafficking and money-laundering operations, the Montesinos organization "has
a long international reach," Lamas said, adding, "Vladimiro Montesinos is characterized by his
capacity for intrigue and conspiracy." His style has permeated layers of public administration, and
Peru's corruption troubles are unlikely to end with Montesinos' trial which could go on for years.
The World Bank survey indicated that 25% of domestic businesses and 35% of foreign companies
operating in Peru pay bribes to obtain government contracts.
Daniel Kaufmann, director of the World Bank's governance program, called corruption a "regressive
tax" that takes its greatest toll on low-income citizens, microenterprises, and small businesses. Of
individuals who reported paying bribes for public services, the average cost was 30 soles about US
$8.60 for people with high incomes and more than twice that for those with low incomes.
Another stark indicator of the cost of corruption is the US$264 million found so far in overseas bank
accounts managed by Montesinos, his cronies, and their front companies. Investigators estimate that
their illicit earnings could amount to more than US$1 billion. The first hard evidence of illicit gains
came in October, when a bank advised Swiss Examining Magistrate Cornelia Cova's office of an
"unusual transaction" in a US$2 million account in Montesinos' name. Since October, she has frozen
US$114 million, sometimes beating a transfer order by a day or two.
Of those funds, US$70 million traced to Montesinos apparently were kickbacks on arms purchases
from Russia and Israel, Cova said. The other US$44 million belong to Montesinos associates,
including former Economy Minister Victor Joy Way. The source of those funds is still under
investigation.

-- End --
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